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* If any significant internal changes emerge from recent Gorbachev-Castro meetings in Havana,
the reasons will hinge more on the United States than on either Cuba or the Soviet Union. From the
onset of close ties between Moscow and Havana 30 years ago, US policy has been the determining
factor in Soviet-Cuban relations. Those relations have always been triangular, never just bilateral.
Indeed, the central feature in all Cuban policies is the close relationship between the external
threat and domestic policy. In this, Cuba is no different from the USSR. Both countries have been
obsessed with national security imperatives. Yet both nations have addressed their respective
security needs in significantly different ways. In the end, Soviet security required glasnost and
perestroika because the USSR could no longer pay the social, economic and political costs of the
arms race without undermining its own stability. This is not the case in Cuba. The fundamental logic
with which the Cuban leadership operates is the need to assure the irreversibility of the revolution.
And Havana firmly believes that in the context of continuing American hostility, a process like
glasnost and perestroika would threaten Cuba's ability to defend itself. Cuban Communist Party
authorities on more than one occasion have said to me that they cannot give up their ability to
mobilize the Cuban people by introducing the market and mass consumerism. Revolutionary
vigilance is the major defense of the Cuban regime. The Cuban authorities are deeply convinced
that even now, the United States is not prepared to accept the Cuban revolution as a fact. They cite
the trade embargo and the absence of normal relations to corroborate this view. The logic of this
line of thought has been overwhelming. Internal experimentation will not occur until the external
threat is removed. Some examples illustrate the correlation: Cuba began a dramatic opening toward
market mechanisms and a freer press while President Carter was in office. As US policy toward
Cuba became less hostile, the Cubans initiated significant internal liberal reforms. When relations
between the two countries deteriorated in the early 1980s following the election of Ronald Reagan,
the political, economic and cultural spaces that had been opened up were closed. Predictably, for
example, Cuba abolished free peasant markets. In the last two years of the Reagan presidency,
as confrontation declined and some negotiations followed, new spaces opened up. The most
dramatic signs have been the release of political prisoners, the emergence of autonomous though
limited human rights organizations, and even the publication of opposition newsletters. There
are Cubans including members of the Communist Party who are favorable to the reforms in the
Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and China. But communist militants are the first to stress that those
options are not available so long as the United States continues its hostility towards Cuba. Under
such circumstances any major opening is automatically negated by the dictates of national security.
The Soviets understand this well. Despite disagreements in the past, the Soviets have never altered
their assistance to the island. They will not do so now. In fact, they may well reduce if not cancel
altogether Cuba's debt. Gorbachev has underscored Cuba's right to determine its own future. He
has also urged the United States to engage in new thinking on Cuba. This would be wise advice for
the United States to heed. The key to Cuba's own glasnost and perestroika, strangely enough, is in
the hands of the White House and not the Kremlin. If Washington drops its hostility, then internal
pressures inside Cuba, as well as the Soviet example, could unleash an entirely new democratic era
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in the Cuban revolution. [Nelson Valdes, associate professor of sociology at the University of New
Mexico and LADB project director, is author of five books on Cuba.]
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